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Abstract: 
Some theorists have recently raised doubts about much of the experimental evidence purporting to 
demonstrate the existence of unconscious perception. In our (2019) in this journal, we argued some 
of these considerations are not decisive. Phillips (forthcoming a) replies thoughtfully to our paper, 
concluding that he is unconvinced by our arguments. Phillips maintains that the view that perception 
is invariably conscious remains, as he puts it, the “default” hypothesis both within the folk 
understanding and experimental study of perception. There is much to agree with in Phillips’ piece, 
but there remain some substantive points of disagreement, which we outline here.  
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1. Introduction 
Is there evidence for unconscious perception? Consider experiments involving masked priming, 
wherein target stimuli are visually presented for limited durations and masked by other stimuli, 
which results in participants’ reporting that they do not see the target stimuli, though the stimuli 
nonetheless prime downstream behavior (see, e.g., Bachmann & Francis 2013). A standard 
interpretation (for an overview, see, e.g., Persuh 2018)—is that while the target stimuli are not 
consciously perceived, they are unconsciously perceived. Call this hypothesis ‘UNCONSCIOUS’.  
There is, however, an alternative hypothesis—namely, that in many such studies, the target 
stimuli are consciously perceived, but in a degraded way, and participants thus fail to report 
perceiving them due to conservative response criteria. Call this competing hypothesis ‘CONSCIOUS’. 
Phillips (e.g., Phillips 2016; Phillips & Block 2016; Peters et al. 2017; Phillips 2018; Phillips 
forthcoming b) has raised doubts about much of the experimental evidence purporting to support 
UNCONSCIOUS as against CONSCIOUS. In our (2019), we argued that many of Phillips’ and some 
related considerations are not decisive. Phillips (forthcoming a) replies thoughtfully to our paper, 
concluding that he “remain[s] unconvinced” (p. x).1  
As we understand it, Phillips’ central claim in his reply is that CONSCIOUS is (or should be) 
what he calls the ‘default’ hypothesis both within the folk understanding and the experimental study 
of perception. It thus seemingly falls to proponents of UNCONSCIOUS to provide compelling 
evidence for their position. In his work, however, Phillips carefully reviews much of the 
experimental literature, arguing that, for any result that proponents of UNCONSCIOUS cite in favor of 
their view, they do not rule out two possibilities. First, most experiments simply do not control 
satisfactorily for criterion bias and thus do not rule out CONSCIOUS. This is often called ‘the problem 
of the criterion’. Second, many studies would seem vulnerable to what Phillips calls ‘the problem of 
attribution’: the possibility that target stimuli are not perceived at all, but rather only perceptually 
processed in a subpersonal way. Phillips concludes that CONSCIOUS thus remains the default 
hypothesis. 
 
1 All references to Phillips’ work refer to his (forthcoming a), unless otherwise noted. 
 
 
We begin in section 2 by arguing that, despite Phillips’ misgivings, UNCONSCIOUS may be the 
default hypothesis in folk and perceptual psychology. But even if UNCONSCIOUS were not the 
default hypothesis, we propose that what matters is that UNCONSCIOUS is an open hypothesis that is 
consistent with folk psychology and taken seriously by some cognitive scientists, which, as we 
argued in our (2019), it plainly is. Moreover, we argue in section 3 that as it stands there are no 
positive reasons to reject UNCONSCIOUS and that more experimental work is thereby needed to 
settle the matter. In section 4, we suggest some ways to move forward in this debate, urging that 
Phillips must provide positive reasons for thinking that CONSCIOUS is true, apart from its 
purportedly being the default hypothesis. We close in section 5 by arguing that Phillips fails to 
adequately respond to the dilemma we posed in our (2019) for the skeptic of UNCONSCIOUS. We 
conclude that there remain good reasons to think that UNCONSCIOUS not only may be, but also is, 
the correct hypothesis. 
 
2. UNCONSCIOUS as the “default” hypothesis 
In his reply, Phillips does not explicitly articulate what he takes a “default” hypothesis to be, but his 
remarks suggest a few possible interpretations. First, he seems to indicate that a default hypothesis 
about some subject matter is the view that is largely accepted in both commonsense discourse and in 
the relevant science(s). In our (2019) paper, we made remarks suggesting that we regard 
UNCONSCIOUS as the default hypothesis in this way, as we urged that rejecting UNCONSCIOUS would 
entail revision of many individuals’ folk and scientific beliefs. Phillips, by contrast, contends that it is 
“certainly disputable” that the folk or many experimentalists believe in unconscious perception (p. 
x).  
Starting with folk psychology, if Phillips were correct that it does not include unconscious 
perception, then perhaps UNCONSCIOUS would be at a theoretical disadvantage. After all, to theorize 
about the nature of something, we must first have a commonsense grip on it, lest our theory fail to 
account for the relevant phenomenon (see, e.g., Sellars 1963). It is therefore important to correctly 
describe our ordinary understanding of perception at the outset.  
In support of the view that common sense countenances unconscious sensory states, we 
cited, for example, Reuter & Sytsma’s (2020) work in experimental philosophy. In reply, Phillips 
raises some doubts about the methodology of those studies. But whether or not his criticisms are 
cogent, more basic evidence that there is folk-psychological support for UNCONSCIOUS is that 
ordinary people and popular media often describe cases of unconscious perception such as 
subliminal advertising or hidden messaging (for a striking example, see, e.g., Grow 2015). Likewise, 
unconscious mentality has been widely discussed in the history of ideas. Prefiguring Freud, 
Nietzsche developed a complex account of the unconscious mind (see, e.g., Katsafanas 2005). And 
Coleridge marveled that “Man exists … to himself & to God alone/—Yea, in how much only to 
God—how much lies below his own Consciousness” (1957, p. 1554). It is unclear to us why one 
would insist that perception is excluded in these conceptions of unconsciousness. 
Phillips might reply that such uses of ‘perception’ nonetheless fail to distinguish between 
personal-level—and thus what he thinks is necessarily conscious—perception and subpersonal 
sensory processing. But we would need independent reason to think that this is the case. Moreover, 
even if this were correct, it would show only that the commonsense conception is not particularly 
nuanced and that even some theoretical conceptions of perception are not sensitive to that 
distinction. We thus think that UNCONSCIOUS is part of folk psychology, or at least consistent with 
it, rather than a “heterodox” view, as Phillips (p. x) regards it.  
Phillips argues instead that CONSCIOUS is the commonsense view, citing Campbell (2011) as 
insisting that our ordinary conception of seeing is of conscious seeing and noting that the OED 
defines perception as involving awareness (p. x). But the OED’s definition is ambiguous between what 
 
 
Rosenthal (e.g., 2005, p. 4) has called ‘transitive’ consciousness or awareness—that, is one’s 
awareness of something—and so-called ‘state’ or ‘phenomenal’ consciousness, the sort of 
consciousness for which there is something that it is like to have it (see Block 1995), which is the 
kind at issue here. It begs the question to assume that transitive consciousness cannot occur in the 
absence of state/phenomenal consciousness. And we can hardly credit Campbell’s assertion without 
further argument.  
In any case, we regard it as somewhat of a scholastic point whether or not ordinary people, 
or historical thought, admit of unconscious perception. We think that they do, but we also think that 
folk views do not go very far in establishing what a theorist should think is actually the case. Even if 
the folk explicitly denied the possibility of unconscious perception, perhaps findings in perceptual 
psychology would nevertheless force us to amend our folk conception of perception to include it, 
just as findings in theoretical physics require us to revise our ordinary conceptions of matter, energy, 
and time. 
What is more important is whether or not perceptual psychology takes UNCONSCIOUS 
seriously as a hypothesis—and it’s clear that it does. As Kuhn (e.g., 1970, p. 12) urged, a reasonable 
way to determine if something is a relatively established phenomenon in a period of “normal 
science” within a paradigm is whether or not it is taught in the textbooks. And unconscious 
perception is routinely mentioned in standard vision science and cognitive psychology texts (e.g., 
Palmer 1999, pp. 639ff; Sternberg & Sternberg 2016, p. 95).    
Further evidence that at least one corner of cognitive science takes seriously UNCONSCIOUS 
is that, if it did not, what would theories of consciousness, such as the global-neuronal workspace 
theory (e.g., Dehaene et al. 2006), purport to be theories of? Such views claim to explain the 
difference between conscious mental states and their unconscious counterparts—grounding it in 
differences such as availability for global broadcast. Theorists would not spill much ink exploring 
these views if they did not believe that there were unconscious personal-level perceptual states to 
contrast with conscious ones. One might think that such views are not accounts of the relevant kind 
of consciousness—that they are instead accounts of, for example, what Block (1995) calls ‘access 
consciousness’. But many such theories, including the global neuronal workspace theory, have been 
explicitly defended as accounts of state/phenomenal consciousness (see, e.g., Naccache 2018).  
Phillips objects that we unfairly note in our (2019) only enthusiasm for unconscious 
perception among experimentalists, while not citing criticisms of it. We are happy to acknowledge 
such criticisms. But it goes without saying that in every scientific area, there are disagreements 
regarding not only methodology, but also the nature and even the existence of target phenomena. 
While astrophysicists once widely accepted the presence of dark matter, for example, the search for 
it has turned up little; the alternative hypothesis that gravity itself operates differently at macroscales 
is one that some astrophysicists are now taking more seriously (for a popular overview, see, e.g., 
Skibba 2020). However this debate ultimately goes, that there are similar disputes about unconscious 
perception in cognitive science itself goes no way at all toward undermining the acceptance of 
UNCONSCIOUS in the scientific community.  
There are, however, passages in which Phillips hints at a slightly different notion of “default” 
hypothesis, wherein a hypothesis is the default just in case it is “more parsimonious than its rivals” 
(p. x). Phillips maintains, moreover, that CONSCIOUS is simpler than UNCONSCIOUS, endorsing 
Snodgrass’s view that CONSCIOUS “postulates only one rather than two [or more] perceptual 
processes” (2002, p. 556, cited on p. x). But UNCONSCIOUS need not be, and is best not, construed 
as positing two perceptual processes. Instead, it should be viewed as positing a single perceptual 
process, which becomes conscious, via mechanisms described by the competing theories of 
consciousness, such as global broadcast.  
 
 
Even if UNCONSCIOUS were not the default hypothesis in either of the two ways scouted 
above, we do not think that this would make a significant difference to this debate. Alternative 
hypotheses are always available in any empirical domain—and we see no good reason to think that 
any special burden or status lies with less widely-held hypotheses than with more widely-held ones. 
Likewise, in general parsimony is a comparatively weak theoretical virtue (see, e.g., Baker 2016)—
and arguably paradigm relative. Quantum mechanics is vastly more complex than Newtonian 
mechanics, but its complexity elegantly explains the available data. 
Perhaps by ‘default hypothesis’ Phillips means instead something like the hypothesis that 
should be assumed within the target area of study unless alternative hypotheses can be proven—and 
thereby that the burden of proof lies with defenders of alternative hypotheses (see, p. x). But we 
doubt that this is the right way to think about hypotheses in general. Theory is always 
underdetermined by data. And as good confirmation holists (e.g., Quine 1951), we regard no 
hypotheses as confirmed or refuted by any restricted set of evidence, much less any particular 
finding. Indeed, a theoretical posit may be perfectly warranted, even in the absence of direct 
experimental evidence for it. Consider, for example, the long scientific search for experimental 
evidence to confirm the existence of the Higgs boson. Relatedly, some reasons to question evidence 
for a hypothesis do not require that we reject the hypothesis. It always remains open to adjust 
background assumptions to reject or re-interpret what may seem to be recalcitrant data, rather than 
give up on a theory. In light of Lavoisier’s findings about combustion, proponents of phlogiston 
attributed to it a negative weight, though the view was ultimately rejected in favor of the oxygen 
theory (see, e.g., Barker & Kitcher 2014, pp. 82-84). While phlogiston theory was never—and 
arguably could never be—decisively refuted, the preponderance of evidence, coupled with various 
theoretical considerations, did the theory in.  
Of course, no theorists can or should be expected to rule out all alternative hypotheses, 
given that many may be outlandish or not genuinely worth considering. Only genuinely open 
alternatives must be given weight and consideration. What makes a hypothesis “genuinely open”? 
While we do not venture a positive account, it is plainly not the mere fact that some theorists 
champion the hypothesis.  Rather, it minimally has to do with whether scientists have good reasons to 
take the hypothesis seriously—such as that it explains much of the available data and makes 
fecund/precise/testable predictions.  
What matters is thus that UNCONSCIOUS is an open hypothesis that is either endorsed by 
folk psychology, or at least consistent with it, and taken seriously by many cognitive scientists. We 
have argued that UNCONSCIOUS meets these criteria. This was the main point of our (2019), not that 
the view is the default hypothesis—whatever that may be.  
What we want, then, are reasons to prefer either CONSCIOUS or UNCONSCIOUS. We thus now 
review some of the ones we explored in our (2019), and Phillips’ replies.   
 
3. Reasons to reject UNCONSCIOUS 
In our (2019) paper, we discussed a series of experiments by Peters & Lau (2015) (“P&L”), which 
seemed to us to supply the best evidence currently available in favor of CONSCIOUS as against 
UNCONSCIOUS. P&L used a two-interval forced-choice (“2IFC”) technique to find that participants 
who made judgments about the presence of pairs of masked stimuli were able to bet accurately on 
the judgment in which they were more confident. Although P&L interpreted their findings as 
supporting CONSCIOUS, we proposed that there is an explanation consistent with UNCONSCIOUS, 
according to which participants do not consciously see the stimuli, but form conscious hunches 
about what was seen, which explain their betting behavior. In his reply, Phillips agrees with us—
though for independent reasons—that P&L’s study fails to offer novel support for CONSCIOUS.  
 
 
Phillips argues that his own alternative hypothesis nevertheless remains preferable, once 
again urging that our UNCONSCIOUS-plus-hunch explanation is less simple than CONSCIOUS. Our 
proposed explanation of P&L’s results purportedly posits not only two streams of perception, but 
also hunches, whereas CONSCIOUS posits only a single stream of conscious perception and response 
bias. However, we are doubtful that our proposed explanation really is more complex. Again, most 
theories of consciousness urge that the same token state can be conscious or not. And while such a 
consciousness mechanism may be psychologically complex, it is not more complex—theoretically 
speaking—than positing psychological mechanisms of response criteria. Similar remarks go for the 
positing of hunches, which we proposed can be understood as an ordinary form of metacognition 
evinced in this task. 
For confirmation-holistic reasons, it is unsurprising that both CONSCIOUS and 
UNCONSCIOUS can explain much of the same evidence. It is rarely the case that a false paradigm 
cannot offer some explanation of data. This is why we are not compelled by Phillips’ strategy of 
arguing that individual pieces of evidence put forth in favor of UNCONSCIOUS are instead compatible 
with CONSCIOUS. By the same token, as we observed in our (2019, pp. 13-14), the possibility that 
participants in standard masking studies fail to report on masked stimuli due to conservative 
response bias is, when considering most available studies, only speculative too. Without additional 
experimentation to tease these hypotheses apart, in many cases it remains open which hypothesis 
accurately describes what is going on.  
Phillips is doubtless right that we therefore cannot conclude that much current evidence 
regarding phenomena such as masked priming or blindsight are decisive evidence for 
UNCONSCIOUS. But no such studies are likewise evidence for CONSCIOUS, unless and until we 
control for criterion bias in the right way. (More on this shortly.) Assuming for the sake of argument 
that both CONSCIOUS and UNCONSCIOUS equally fit the available data, perhaps we should not decide 
between them until more evidence is available. 
 
4. Ways forward? 
We nonetheless do think there may be ways to move forward in this debate. After all, the 
hypotheses under consideration make different experimental predictions. The proponent of 
CONSCIOUS holds that, if we control for criterion bias, participants would verbally report what 
would otherwise seem to be unconscious perception. On UNCONSCIOUS, by contrast, even if we 
adequately control for criterion bias, there would be unreportable perceptual states. 
  To test between CONSCIOUS and UNCONSCIOUS, we need a way to control not only for 
criterion bias, but also for the possibility that reporting effects are driven by conscious hunches and 
not conscious perception. The best attempt (so far) at controlling for criterion bias—namely, P&L’s 
experiments—do not offer unimpeachable results in favor of CONSCIOUS. But perhaps there is a 
kind of bias-free task that is also capable of controlling for the possibility of conscious hunches. If 
such an experiment demonstrated that, under such conditions, participants would verbally report on 
masked stimuli, then we would be more inclined to accept CONSCIOUS.  
On the other hand, one might think that the most straightforward way to control for 
criterion bias is to ensure that perceptual discrimination is at chance—that is, focus on experiments 
in which the signal-to-noise ratio is equal to 0, but priming effects are observed. But, as we observed 
in our (2019), such experiments purportedly face Phillips’ problem of attribution—namely, the 
worry that whatever priming effects participants demonstrate are driven not by personal-level 
unconscious perceptual states, but rather only by subpersonal states of perceptual processing.  
Phillips’ argument here depends on adopting a rather stringent characterization of personal-
level perception. On his view, the best evidence we have that a state is genuinely perceptual is that it 
is available to central coordinating agency or, as he more recently puts it, for the guidance of 
 
 
intentional action (e.g., Phillips 2019, p. 7). But in the masked-priming experiments he canvasses in 
his (2018) (e.g., Jiang et al. 2006, Norman et al. 2013), all we seem to have evidence for are 
“stimulus-driven, reflex-like” (p. 495) responses that fall short of the required form of agency.  
We argued in our (2019) that, even granting Phillips’ criteria, we have evidence for 
unconscious visual states that play the role that Phillips requires of them. We focused especially on 
the case of D.F., an individual with visual-form agnosia resulting from damage to her ventral stream. 
We urged on the basis of a discussion of Pisella and colleagues’ (2000) results that at slower time 
scales (over 300 ms), we have no reason to doubt that D.F.’s actions, which are guided solely by 
unconscious dorsal-stream vision, are sensitive to intention in the way Phillips’ criterion requires. We 
also argued that there is no basis to Phillips’ inference that the type of action that dorsal-stream 
vision supports is not attributable to the agent because it is automatic. As we stressed, much of our 
automatic behavior—for example, that which is involved in skilled action—is so attributable, as 
evidenced by its sensitivity to and tight interfacing with an agent’s intentions (see, e.g., Fridland 
2017; Shepherd 2019; Pacherie & Mylopoulos 2020).  
In response, Phillips argues on the basis of a different set of empirical results that D.F.’s 
actions may indeed be guided by conscious vision. He also argues against our interpretation of the 
empirical work we cite (Liu & Todorov, 2007) in favor of the sensitivity of automatic action to 
intention. There are, however, further studies to cite in response (see, e.g., Todorov & Jordan 2000); 
and we suspect that there are ways to challenge Phillips’ interpretations of the relevant empirical 
results, which could be explored in future work.  
But we again do not consider this kind of back-and-forth to be a particularly fruitful strategy 
for settling the debate. What we arguably need to do now is step back and examine theoretical 
considerations for and against these hypotheses.  
Here is thus one theoretical worry for Phillips’ position: that his case rests on a distinction 
between the personal and subpersonal levels of perceptual processing that has been characterized in 
competing ways by many different theorists (for review, see, e.g., Drayson 2012)—and thus 
threatens to be arbitrary (see, e.g., Block’s contribution in Peters et al. 2017, p. 8).  
Moreover, why should we think that there are any clean criteria by way of which we can draw 
this distinction? (cf. Taylor 2019, who thus concludes that there is no fact of the matter regarding 
when there is unconscious perception.) Indeed, we should expect our theorizing about the nature of 
personal-level perception to depend holistically on other theorizing regarding related phenomena 
such as action or perceptual thought (see Shepherd and Mylopoulos ms.). Likewise, we should 
remain insistent that this debate be substantive. If we adopt overly demanding requirements on 
personal-level perception, perhaps not much hangs on whether we call complex unconscious 
perceptual processing ‘perception’.  
Finally, we note that Phillips himself offers no positive theoretical reason favoring CONSCIOUS 
as against UNCONSCIOUS, other than claiming that the former is the (simpler) default position. Such 
reasons should be given. For our part, we did offer one broadly theoretical argument against 
skepticism about unconscious perception in our (2019). We turn now to Phillips’ reply to that 
argument, which we find unsuccessful. 
 
5. Revisiting the dilemma for skepticism about unconscious perception 
In our (2019), we argued that skeptics about unconscious perception face a dilemma: either they 
must maintain that other kinds of mentality such as beliefs or desires also cannot occur 
unconsciously, or they must explain why perceptual states are unique in the mind in this regard. 
Both options, we maintained, are questionable.  
Phillips attempts to resolve the dilemma by distinguishing mental states from mental 
occurrences, where the former do not unfold temporally and are thus not candidates for being 
 
 
conscious, while the latter do unfold temporally and can thus be conscious. Phillips seems to allow 
that mental episodes, such as the fading of an emotion, can occur without consciousness, but he 
maintains that these can be explained entirely by appeal to transitions between nonconscious mental 
states. He writes that, “In this light, it is not unreasonable to propose that all genuinely mental 
episodes other than those which can be wholly analysed in terms of transitions between non-
conscious states are conscious” (p. x).  
But we see no support for this position. Instead, we propose that some beliefs, desires, or 
emotional states arguably manifest in mental occurrences—thoughts, wishes, and so forth—that 
themselves can likewise occur without being conscious. And there is much support for this view. 
There is, for example, evidence that people can engage in unconscious inference. Consider 
Mandelbaum’s (2016) work on implicit bias, which demonstrates that we often act in biased ways 
towards individuals of certain social groups in ways that are best explained by our engaging in 
patterns of transitions between occurrent propositional attitudes of which we are unaware. As 
Mandelbaum argues, such inferences are not interactions among unconscious dispositions, but 
among unconscious mental occurrences (see also, e.g., Jenkin 2020). Similar remarks go for other 
sorts of cognition, such as occurrent desiderative and emotional states (see, e.g., Rosenthal 2008). If 
this is right, then we can run the original dilemma again, but this time aimed at perception and other 
mental occurrences: why is it that perception alone always occurs consciously, while thoughts and 
wishes do not? 
In reply, Phillips might appeal to the supposed temporal dimensions of perceptual 
occurrences that differ from those of their non-perceptual counterparts. But this cuts no ice; just as 
one can momentarily perceive red or have a perceptual experience of a passing scene that occurs 
over time, one can both momentarily have the thought that p or a fleeting desire—or think over 
time that p or long for something.  
Without an independently motivated reason to think that thought and perception differ in a 
way relevant to consciousness, Phillips has not adequately addressed our dilemma. But we never 
intended the dilemma to be dispositive—simply one theoretical consideration to add to the 
collection of evidence that abductively supports the existence of unconscious perception.2  
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